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Of the Right to Taive a Tort, etc.
excludes all questions as to exemplary damages. The general
rule is, that in an action against an executor or administrator
for the torts of his decedent, exemplary damages are not
recoverable (a). In Massachusetts they are expressly dis-
allowed by statute in such an action (b).
Of the defendant: The act of the defendant, and the
wrongful elements incident thereto, furnish the reason for
awarding exemplary damages. The fact that the defendant
bears malice toward a third person will not entitle the plaintiff
to receive exemplary damages at his hands; nor will they be
given where the injury is a mere mistake of judgment; they
are incident to compensation.
Such is the doctrine of the law regarding vindictive dam-
ages in actions for tort; they are not awarded under any
claim of right by the party, but for reasons of an enlarged
public policy.
OF THE RIGHT TO WAIVE A TORT AND SUE IN
ASSUMPSIT.
A TOR'P is a wrong or injury done by one party to another,
for which the law gives a remedy in damages. It differs from
a crime, in that it is a wrong done to an individual, and to be
redressed at his instance, while a crime is a wrong done to the
commonwealth, and to be punished by means of a public
prosecution.
Every breach of contract is in a certain qualified sense a
wrong; but an action to recover damages therefor differs from
an action for a tort, in that in the former the contract itself is
counted upon, while in the latter the suit is for some wrongful
act or omission of duty which, though it sometimes springs
from or is connected with a disregard of contract relations, is
nevertheless something more than a mere failure to perform
an agreement.
The distinctions between an action for a tort and one upon
(a) 51 Pa. St. 315. (b) Mass. G. S. 1866, ch. 128, sec. 2.
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contract-are such that where the one will lie the other gener-
ally will not; but there are nevertheless some cases in which
either may be brought at the election of the party injured.
Thus, it is sometimes the case that in a business relation the
law makes it the duty of a party to observe a certain course of
conduct with regard to the rights of others, where by contract
he has also undertaken for the same thing; and in such a
case a breach of duty is coincident with a breach of the con-
tract, and the party damnified has his election to sue either for
the tort or upon the contract.
There are also cases of breach of contract where a wrong
has been done not strictly coincident, but where nevertheless
the damages recoverable are the same as those following a
breach of the contract, so that a recovery for the tort gives
complete compensation. In these cases, also, the party may
elect the form of action, and a recovery in one will be a bar to
a recovery in the other.
In still other cases, although the act done is purely one of
tort, the law suffers the party injured to charge the other in
contract, and to recover upon the basis of agreement, though
in fact no agreement existed. In these cases the law implies
a promise on the part of the wrong doer to do what he ought
to do, and will not suffer him to dispute the implication. And
where this is permitted the party injured is said to have a right
to waive the tort and sue as upon promises.
It is said by an eminent Judge in one case that " no party
is bound to sue in tort where, by converting the action into
an action on contract, he does not prejudice the defendant;,
and generally speaking it is more favorable to the defendant
that lie should be sued in contract, because that form of action.
lets in a set-off and enables him to pay money into court" (a).
This, lowever, is stating the rule much too broadly, for in
most cases the tort feasor could not be prejudiced by conivert-
ing the action into one on contract if the law would suifer it;,
but well settled rules forbid.
The right to waive a tort and sue in assumpsit seems to
have been first distinctly recognized in Lamine vs. .Dorrell
(b), where assumpsit was brought by an administrator to.




HeinOnline  -- 2 Bench & B. (o.s.) 219 1870-1871
Of the Right t4 Waive a Tort, etc.
recover the moneys received by the defendant on a sale made
by him, without authority, of debentures belonging to the
estate. It was objected that the action would not lie, because
the defendant sold the debentures under a claim of adminis-
tration in himself, and therefore could not be said to receive
that money to the use of the plaintiff which indeed be had
received to his own use; but the plaintiff ought to have
brought trover or detinue for the indentures. Powell J. said:
"It is clear the plaintiff might have maintained detinue or
trover for the indentures, but the plaintiff may dispense with
the wrong and suppose the sale made by his consent, and
bring an action for the money that they were sold for as
money received to his use." And Holt Ch. J. said: " Sup-
pose a person pretends to be guardian in socage, and enters
into the land of the infant, and takes the profits; though he
is not rightful guardian, yet an action of account will lie
against him. So the defendant in this case, pretending to
receive the moneys the debentures were sold for in the right
of the intestate, why should he not be answerable for it to the
iyntestate's administrator ?"
In Longohamp vs. Kenney (a) this doctrine was applied to
the case of one who, being in possession of a masquerade
ticket belonging to another, which was issued for the purposes
of sale, refused either to redeliver it or to account for its value.
In an action for money had and received Lord Mansfield said:
"If the defendant sold the ticket and received the value of it,
it was for the plaintiff's use, because the ticket was his. Now
as the defendant has not produced the ticket, it is a fair pre-
sumption that he has sold it." And the plaintiff had judg-
ment.
In Hambly Vs. Trott (b) the same eminent jurist considers
the matter farther. The question there was, what actions sur-
vive and what do not. " In most if not all the cases," he
says, " where trover lies against the testator, another action
might be brought against the executor which would answer
the purpose. An action on the custom of the realm against a
common carrier, is for a tort and supposed crime; the plea is
not guilty; therefore it will not lie against an executor. But
(a) Doug. 137. (b) Cowp. 375.
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assumpsit, which is another action for the same cause, will lie.
.So if a man take a horse from another and bring him back
again, an action of trespass will not 'lie against his executor,
though it would lie against him; but an action for the use and
hire of the horse will lie against the executor.
" There is a case," he proceeds, "in Sir Thomas Raymond
(a) which sets this matter in a clear light. There, in an action
on the case the plaintiff declared ' that he was possessed of a
cow which he delivered to the testator, Richard Bailey, in his
lifetime, to keep the same for the use of him the plaintiff,
which cow the said Richard afterwards sold, and did convert
and dispose of the money to his own use; and that neither
the said Richard in his lifetime nor the defendant after his
death, ever paid the said money.' Upon this state of the case
no one can doubt but the executor was liable for the value.
But the special injury required him to plead that the testator
was not guilty. The jury found him guilty. It was moved
in arrest of judgment, because this was a tort for which the
executor was not liable to answer; but moritur cum persona.
For the plaintiff it was insisted that though an executor is not
chargeable for a misfeasance, yet for a nonfeasance he is; as
for non-payment of money levied upon a feri facias, and
cited Cro. Car. 539, 9 Co. 50 a, where this very difference
was agreed; for non-feasance shall never be vi et armis nor
contra pacem. But notwithstanding this the court held it was
a tort, and that the executor ought not to be chargeable. Sir
Thomas Raymond adds, ' vide Saville, 40, a difference taken.'
That was the case of Sir Henry Sherrington, who had .cut
down trees upon the Queen's land, and converted them to his
own use in his life time. Upon an information against his
widow after his decease, Manwood J. said: ' In every case
where any price or value is set upon the thing in which the
offence is committed, if the defendant dies his executor shall
be chargeable; but where the action is for damages only in
satisfaction for the injury done, there his executor shall not be
liable.' These are the words Sir Thomas Raymond refers to.
Here, therefore, is a fundamental distinction. If it is a sort of
injury by which the offender acquires no gain to himself at
(a) Bailey vs. Birtles, Sir T. Raym. 71.
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the expense of the sufferer, as beating or imprisoning a man,
etc., there the person injured has only a reparation for the
delictum in damages to be assessed by a jury. But, where,
besides the crime, property has been acquired which benefits
the testator, there an action for the value of the property shall
survive against the executor. As, for instance, the executor
shall not be chargeable for the injury done by the testator in
cutting down another man's trees, but for the benefit arising
to the testator for the value or sale of the trees, he shall."
Mr. Addison, in his treatise on the law of torts, dismisses
this subject after very brief consideration. " If a man," he
says, " has taken possession of property, and sold or disposed
of it without lawful authority, the owner may either disaffirm
his act and treat him as a wrong doer, and sue him for a tres-
pass or for a conversion of the property; or lie may affirm his
acts and treat him as his agent, and claim the benefit of the
transaction; and if he has once affirmed his acts and treated
him as an agent, he cannot afterwards treat him as a wrong
doer, nor can he affirm his acts in part and avoid them as to
:the rest. If, therefore, goods have been sold by a wrong doer,
:and the owner thinks fit to receive the price, or part thereof,
Ihe ratifies and adopts the transaction, and cannot afterwards
treat it as a wrong." (a) Of the correctness of the doctrine
as thus stated there is no dispute, and it is well supported by
Judicial decisions (b).
The right to waive the tort is not, however, confined to
cases of sales of property, but is applicable to all other cases
wheh the defendant has by wrongful act become possessed of
money which in equity and good conscience belongs to the
plaintiff. As where one without authority collects moneys
(a) Addison on tort.s. p. 33 citing Brower v. Sparrow. 7 B. & C. 310, and
Lvthgoe-v. Vernon, 5 H. & N. 180; 29 Law J. Exch. 164.
(b) SeeHirctie v. Campbell, 2 W.BI. 827; Antttsyv.Barrv,2B &B. 369;
Pwell v. Rtes, 7 A. &E. 426; B -riev v. Taylor, 5 Hill, 577; Miller v. Miller,
9 Pipk. aR; Gilmnore v. Wilber, 12 Pick. 120; Appleton v. Bancroft, 10 Met.
231; Mon;ontv. R- gers, 2 Scam. 317; Staat v. Evans,35 Ill., 455; Leighton v.
Preston,.9 Gill, 201; Gra) v. Griffisb, 10 Watts. 431; Goodsnow v. Layder,
8 Greene Iowa, 599; White v. Brooks, 43 N. H. 402. "The principle is"
sas Pollock C. B. " that the owner of property wrongfully taken has a
right to follow it and adopt any act done to it, and treat the proceeds as
money had and kreceive d to his use." Neat v. Harding 20 Law J. Rep.
(N. S.) Exch. 2W; S. C 4 Eng. L. & Eq. 464.. " Subject" he adds, " to
certain exceptious," which, however, he does not point out.
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which were payable to another; (a) or a trespasser upon lands
demands and receives wharfage dues; (b) or the defendant by
deceit and fraud obtains money from the plaintiff; (c) and the
like.
But when we go beyond the cases in which money has
actually come to the hands of the defendant, all is not so clear
upon the authorities. There are many cases which hold that
if the defendant by means of a tort has obtained money's
worth, assumpsit may be brought; as where property is
wrongfully sold, and other property received in payment; (d)
or the apprentice or slave of another is knowingly employed
without the master's permission ; (e) or one turns his cattle
upon the land of another, and pastures them there without
the owner's consent; (f) or by the instrumentality of the
defendant in an execution, the property of another is sold to
satisfy the judgment (g). And it has also been held that
where property has been wrongfully taken and used, assump-
sit may be brought for the use after its return (h).
And in some cases a strong disposition has been manifested
to sustain an action of assumpsit wherever an unlawful con-
version appears, whether the defendant has been benefited
thereby or not.
in Walker v. Davis it is said "Ordinarily in the case of
torts it is at the election of the owner of property wrongfully
taken, to bring his action for the tort, or, waiving that, to
bring assumpsit; and when he brings the latter, the defendant
is estopped to say there was no promise, and that lie took the
property wrongfully, or to set up his own fraud or wrong in
defence of the suit (i)." If the doctrine of the right to waive
the tort and sue in assunipsit rested solely upon the early
English decisions, there could be little doubt, we think, that a.
statement of the general principle as lroad as here given
(a, Hasser v. Wallis, 1 Sflk. 28. (b) O'Cnnlpv v. Natches, 1 8 & M. 31.
(c) Pearsoll v. Ch'Ipiii, 44 Penn. St. 9. (d) Miller v Miller,'? Pick. 133;
Sirickland v. B-mii, 14 Ala. 511; See Hiton v. Weaherali, 5 Harr. 38;
Budd v. Hiler, 3 Dutc~h. 43; Phelps v. Cnaut, g0 Vi. 283. (e) Cirdis v.
Bridges, Comb. 450: Fooer v. Stewart, 3 M. & S 191: Lightly v. Clous-
ton, 1 Tanut. 112; Munsey v. G odwini. 3 N. H 272; Stovk- tt v. Waikins's
Admr. 2 G. & J. 3261. (f) Wlelh v. lagg, 12 Mich. 42. cnpure Steain
v. Dillingham, 22 Vt. 624. (g) H ckley v. Swigert., 5 B. Maur. 86. (h)
Stocket v. Watkins, 2 G & J. 326; Alsbrook v. Hathaway, 3 Sieed, 454.
(i) Walker v. Davis, 1 Gray, 509, per Thomas J. See Badger v. Painuey,
15 MAss. 859.
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would be supported by them; and there are many cases
which hold that assumpsit may be brought for property wrong-
fully converted by the defendant, whether sold or not (a).
But however reasonable these cases may appear, and harmon-
ious as they seem to be with the general rules governing the
action of assumpsit, they do not appear to .have received uni-
versal approval, and at this time probably the majority of
judicial decisions upon the point under discussion is opposed
to them.
In Massachusetts the rule is very clear, that to authorize the
plaintiff to waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, a sale of the
property by the defendant must be shown (b). In New
Hampshire the Courts have finally settled down upon the
same rule, overruling the earlier decisions in the same State
(e). In Illinois and Wisconsin the same rule is adopted (d).
In Vermont it is said " the law is too well settled to admit of
discussion, that to enable the owner of goods to waive the tort
and sue in assumpsit, where they have been wrongfully taken
from him, the goods must have been converted into money (e).
And there are like rulings in other States, some of which
appear to have been made on such full consideration of the
subject, that they are not likely to be disturbed hereafter in
the same States (f). We must consequently expect that upon
(a) Hill v. Davis, 3 N. H. 384; Floyd v. Wiley, 1 Mo. 430; Ford v.
Caldwell, 3 Hill (S. C.) 248; Baker v. Corey, 15 Ohio 9; Fiquet v. Alli-
son, 12 Mich. 328; Webster v. Driutwater, 5 Green]. 323, per Mellen
Ch. J.; Jones v. Buzzard, 1 Hemp. 240; Johnson v. Reed, 3 Eng. 202;
Lqheaume v. Hill, 1 Mo. 643. See also note to Putnam v. Wise, 1 Hill
240; note to 2 Greenl. Ev. § 108. In Schweizer v. Weiber, 6 Rich. 159,
this doctrine was held applicable to the case of one who had wrongfully
taken property, and in whose hands it had been accidentally destroyed.
See also Halleck v. Mixer. 16 Cal. 574; Cooper v. Berry, 21 Geo. 526.
(b) Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick, 285. This appears to be a leading case on this
subject. And see Glass Co. v. Walcott, 2 Allen, 227.
(r) Mann v. Locke, 11 N. H 248; Smith v. Smith, 43 N. H. 536.
(d) Morrison v. Rogerq,2 Scam. 317; O'Reer v. Strong, 13 111. 688; Kelty
v Owens, 4 Cand. 166; Elliott v. Jackson, 3 Wis. 649.
(-) Smaras v. Ddlingtain, 23 Vr. 627, per Bennett J. And be adds:
"The rule is the same where the trespass consisted in breaking the
plaintiff's freehold, and cutting and carrying away the trees standing
thereon. The trees must have been sold by the defendant."
(f) See Willett v. Willett, 3 Watts, 277; Pearsoll v. Chapin. 44 Penn.
St. 9; Guthrie v. Wickliffe, I A. K. Marsh. 83; Fnller v. Dus-n, 36 Ala. 73;
Tucker v. Jewett, 32 Conn. 563; Saunders v. Hamilton, 3 Dana, 552; Bar-
low v. Stalworth, 27 Gen. 517; Pike v. Bright, 39 Ala. 332; Eim rson v.
NeNamara, 41 Me. 565. Compare Bennett v. Francis, 2 B. & P. 554;
Read v. Hutchinson. 3 Camp. 351.
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this particular branch of our subject, the authorities in the
different states will continue to exhibit hereafter the same
want of harmony which is now apparent.
In general a promise will not be implied unless it appear
either that the defendant intended it should be, or that natural
justice requires it in consequence of some benefit received by
him (a). A mere naked trespass cannot therefore be made
the basis of an implied assumpsit (b). And where the defend-
ant has entered upon real estate under a claim of right
adverse to the plaintiff, the law will not imply a promise, not-
withstanding lie has irade his tortious possession beneficial
(c). The action of trespass is the proper action for the trial
of the adverse claim in these cases.
It seems that an officer who takes goods by color of lawful
authority is not liable to the owner in assumpsit before he had
sold them and received the price, nor afterwards if he has paid
over the money in pursuance of his process before notice of
the plaintiff's claim (d). But an officer who has kept a person
in confinement at hard labor, under a void sentence, and
received personally the benefit of his labor, is liable for the
value thereof in an action for work and labor (e).
(a) Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denlo, 377, per Beardsley J. quoting and adopting
the language of Mellen Ch. J. in Webster v. Drinkwater 5 Greeni. 323.
(b) Jones v. Hoar, 5 Pick. 285; Stearns v. Dillingham, 27 Vt. 624. But
where the defendant has received money by means of the trespass, it may
be recovered, as we have before seen, in this action. See O'Couley v.
Natches, 1 S. & M. 31.
(c) Carson River &c. Co. v. Bassett, 2 Nev. 249. As where the defendant
has used a private artificial canal, under a claim that it is a public highway.
Ward v. Warner, 8 Mich. 508. In this case ManningJ. intimates an opinion
that the tort cannot be waived in the case of personal property appropriated
under an adverse claim. He says: " In a case of pure trespass, by which I
mean one committed without color of right to the property taken, the Court
may well say to thedefendant, 'you shall not be permitted to defeat the action
by showing you took the goods without intending to pay for them, or with
an intention to do a wrong with which the plaintiff, by putting a more
charitable construction on your conduct, has not thought proper to charge
you.' This, I think is all that is meant by waiving the trespass and sueing
for goods sold and delivered. There is no objection to such a course,
when the trespass is wholly separate from the right of property; but when
it is mixed up with the right of property, and the question of trespass or
ino trespass depends on that right, and must stand or fall with it, the tres-
pass caunot be waived, because none is admitted; and the law will not
imply a promise to pay, as defendant took the goods in his own right."
But this doctine, though receiving some support from Wynne v. Lathan,
6 Jones L. 329, is opposed to that of several of the cases hereinbefore cited,
including that of Fiquet v. Allison, in the same Court. 12 Mich. 328.
(d) Osborn v. Bell, 5 Denio, 370. (e) Patterson v. Prior, 18 Ind. 441.
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Where an express promise exists, the law will not imply a
different one; and therefore if one purchases goods upon a
condition which he afterwards fails to perform, but keeps and
converts the goods to his own use, the vendor must sue upon
the conditional contract, or in trover. He cannot waive the
tort, and sue upon an implied contract for goods sold (a).
These references will perhaps sufficiently illustrate the
general current of decision on the subject of election of reme-
dies in the case of torts. They will perhaps also show that
the right to waive a tort and pursue a remedy as upon con-
tract is not so general as is sometimes supposed. It may be
added, however, that if, in case of a tort the party wronged
elects to sue on contract, and fails to establish a valid promise,
express or implied, he is not bound by that election, but may
afterwards sue for the tort. The cases in which infants have
obtained property by purchase, on the false statement that
they were of full age, and afterwards defeated an action on the
contract of purchase on the ground of infancy, are illustrations
of this rule (b).
(a) Strutt v. Smith, I C. M. & R. 315; Allen v. Ford, 19 Pick. 217.
(b) See Badger v. Phinney, 15 Mass. 359; Walker v. Davis, 1 Gray 509.
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